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Abstract
Agent systems based on the Belief, Desire and Intention model of Rao and Georgeﬀ
have been used for a number of successful applications. However, it is often diﬃcult
to learn how to apply such systems, due to the complexity of both the semantics
of the system and the computational model. In addition, there is a gap between
the semantics and the concepts that are presented to the programmer. One way to
bridge this gap is to re-cast the foundations of such systems into a logic program-
ming framework. In particular, the integration of backward- and forward-chaining
techniques for linear logic provides a natural starting point for this investigation. In
this paper we discuss the language design issues for such a system, and particularly
the way in which the potential choices for rule evaluation in a forward-chaining
manner is crucial to the behaviour of the system.
1 Introduction
An increasingly popular programming paradigm is that of agent-oriented pro-
gramming. This paradigm, often described as a natural successor to object-
oriented programming [18], is highly suited for applications which are em-
bedded in complex dynamic environments, and is based on human concepts,
such as beliefs, goals and plans. This allows a natural speciﬁcation of sophis-
ticated software systems in terms that are similar to human understanding,
thus permitting programmers to concentrate on the critical properties of the
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application rather than getting absorbed in the intricate detail of a compli-
cated environment. Agent technology has been used in areas for applications
such as air traﬃc control, automated manufacturing, and maintenance tasks
on the space shuttle [19].
There are many possible conceptions of agent-oriented programming. How-
ever a common theme [8,35] is that agent systems should include properties
such as
• pro-activeness: the agent has an agenda to pursue and will persist in trying
to achieve its aims
• reactiveness: the agent will notice and respond to changes in the environ-
ment
• autonomy: the agent will act without necessarily being instructed to take
particular steps
• situated: the agent both inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by the environment
around it
Other possible attributes of agent systems include being social, (i.e. team-
ing up with other agents in order to achieve common goals), learning (i.e.
taking note of previous actions and adjusting future actions accordingly), and
rationality, (i.e. working to achieve its aims, and not working against them).
One of the most popular and successful technical realisations of such con-
ceptions is the framework of Rao and Georgeﬀ [28], in which the notions
of Belief, Desire and Intention are central, and hence are often referred to as
BDI agents. Roughly speaking, beliefs represent the agent’s current knowledge
about the world, including information about the current state of the environ-
ment inferred from perception devices (such as cameras or microphones) and
messages from other agents, as well as internal information. Desires represent
a state which the agent is trying to achieve, such as the safe landing of all
planes currently circling the airport, or the achievement of a certain ﬁnan-
cial return on the stock market. Intentions are the chosen means to achieve
the agent’s desires, and are generally implemented as plans (which may be
thought of as procedures which come with pre-conditions (to determine when
a plan is applicable) and intended outcomes (to state what is achieved upon
the successful completion of the plan)).
Rao and Georgeﬀ gave both a logical system incorporating these concepts
[28] (a version of temporal logic extended to include the appropriate notions of
belief, desire and intention) and an architecture for the execution of programs
following the BDI paradigm [29].
Whilst BDI-based systems have been successfully applied in a number of
areas, there remain some foundational and design issues to be solved. One
such issue is the “gap” between the BDI theory, which is based on branching-
time temporal logic (in which there is only one past but many possible futures)
and the BDI architectures on which systems such as dMARS[6], JACK[1] and
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JAM[17] are based. The BDI theory has an elegant description of the rela-
tionship between beliefs, desires and intentions via possible worlds, but the
architectures tends to deal in beliefs, events and plans, and it is not alto-
gether obvious how these relate to the given semantics (although the latter
can clearly be seen as an inspiration and speciﬁcation of the ideal behaviour).
The closure of this gap is not helped by the development of purely model-
theoretic approaches to the semantics of such systems, with a corresponding
lack of emphasis on the proof-theoretical aspects (although [30] is a notable
step in this direction).
A second diﬃculty, particularly when it comes to making agent-oriented
programming accessible to a wide audience, is the complexity of the BDI
semantics. Whilst there is no magical way to simplify an inherently complex
system, it has generally been the case that successful applications of this
technology has come from either the developers of the agent system or from
groups who have relied on a signiﬁcant amount of input from a BDI expert
(who are generally in very short supply). Hence in order for BDI agents to
become signiﬁcantly more widespread, a simpler means of understanding the
system is required [33].
One way to address this is to re-cast the basic agent model into a logic
programming framework. As noted by Kowalski and Sadri [21] the main
technical question here is to determine how to incorporate actions and reac-
tive behaviour into a logic programming environment (which has traditionally
been very strong on backward-chaining methods, and thus is closely related
to traditional planning techniques).
Our approach is based on the use of linear logic [10], a logic designed with
bounded resources in mind. In particular, linear logic is not only a conservative
extension of classical logic (so that classical reasoning, where appropriate, may
be used), but also has been shown to be a natural way to model concurrency,
database updates and state-based transitions [11,15,12]. In particular, it has
been shown that actions, such as those required by the classic blocks world
scenario, can be modelled simply and naturally in linear logic [22,23]. Given
also the existence of a number of logic programming languages based on linear
logic (such as LO [4], Lolli [15], Forum [24], LLP [16] and Lygon [12]), it seems
natural to explore the use of linear logic as a basis for BDI-style agent systems.
In [13] it was shown how a notion of forward-chaining could be introduced
into the standard sequent calculus for linear logic in order to provide such
behaviour. In [14] the use of this framework as a basis for agent systems was
discussed. In this paper we develop this direction further by examining the
language design issues for such a system.
This paper is organised as follows: in §2 we give an overview of BDI
systems, linear logic and linear logic programming, and in §3 we discuss the
design issues for an agent programming system based on linear logic. In §4 we
focus on scheduling issues and in §5 we discuss our conclusions and possibilities
for further work.
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2 Background
2.1 BDI Agents
The BDI model (Belief Desire Intention) of Rao and Georgeﬀ [28,29] is a
popular model for intelligent agents which has its basis in philosophy [5] and
oﬀers a logical theory which deﬁnes the mental attitudes of Belief, Desire, and
Intention using a modal logic; a system architecture; a number of implemen-
tations of this architecture (e.g. PRS, JAM, dMars, JACK); and applications
demonstrating the viability of the model. The central concepts in the BDI
model are [9, page 144]:
Beliefs: The agent’s information about the environment;
Desires: Objectives to be accomplished, possibly with each objective’s asso-
ciated priority/payoﬀ;
Intentions: The currently chosen course of action; and
Plans: Means of achieving certain future world states. Intuitively, plans are
an abstract speciﬁcation of both the means for achieving certain desires and
the options available to the agent. Each plan has (i) a body describing the
primitive actions or sub-goals that have to be achieved for plan execution
to be successful; (ii) an invocation condition which speciﬁes the triggering
event, and (iii) a context condition which speciﬁes the situation in which
the plan is applicable.
The BDI model has developed over about 15 years and there are certainly
strong relationships between the theoretical work and implemented systems.
The paper [29] describes an abstract architecture which is instantiated in sys-
tems such as dMars and JACK and shows how that is related to the BDI
logic. However, the concepts that have been found to be useful for develop-
ment within these systems do not necessarily match the concepts most devel-
oped in the theoretical work. Neither are they necessarily exactly the concepts
which have arisen within particular implemented systems such as JACK. An
additional complication is confusion and small diﬀerences between similar con-
cepts, such as Desires and Goals, which receive diﬀering emphasis in diﬀerent
work at diﬀerent times. Some key diﬀerences between the philosophy, theory,
and implementation viewpoints of BDI are shown below.
Philosophy: Belief Desire Intention
Theory: Belief Goal Intention
Implementation: Relational DB (or arbitrary object) Event Running Plan
2.2 Linear Logic
Linear logic [10] is sometimes described as resource-sensitive, in that the notion
of resource is a natural one in this logic. The traditional techniques of logic
treat two copies of a formula as being equivalent to one copy (as mathematical
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truth is not dependent on the number of times a property is stated), and hence
formulae can be arbitrarily copied. However, this does not ﬁt well with some
application areas, in which there is a ﬁnite amount of resources, such as money,
computer memory, ﬂoor space or execution time. Resource-sensitive logics
such as linear logic do not allow arbitrary copying; in linear logic, by default,
each formula has to be used exactly once. This property means that linear
logic is a natural way to study state changes, and so provides a more direct
way to model resource-bounded applications than the traditional techniques.
In particular, linear logic has been applied to concurrency problems [10,11],
database updates [15] and planning problems [22,23].
Linear logic contains two forms of conjunction: one which is “cumulative”,
i.e. for which p ⊗ p ≡ p, and one which is not, i.e. p N p ≡ p. Roughly
speaking, the former is what allows linear logic to deal with resource issues,
whilst the latter allows for these issues to be overlooked (or, more precisely, for
an “internal” choice to be made between the resources used), as, by default,
each formula in linear logic represents a resource which must be used exactly
once.
Consider the following menu from a restaurant:
fruit or seafood (in season)
main course
all the chips you can eat
tea or coﬀee
Note that the ﬁrst choice, between fruit and seafood, is a classical disjunc-
tion; we know that one or the other of these will be served, but we cannot
predict which one, which may be thought of as an “external” choice, in that
someone else makes the decision. On the other hand, the choice between tea
and coﬀee is an “internal” choice — the customer is free to choose which one
shall be served. Note the internal choice is a conjunction; in order to sat-
isfy this, the restauranteur has to be able to supply both tea and coﬀee, and
not just one of them. The chips course clearly involves a potentially inﬁnite
amount of resources, in that there is no limit on the amount of chips that the
customer may order. We represent this situation by preﬁxing such formulae
with a !. Note also that the meal consists of four components, and hence we
connect the components with ⊗. Hence we have the following representation
of the menu:
(fruit ⊕ seafood) ⊗ main ⊗ ! chips ⊗ (tea N coffee)
where we write ⊕ for the classical disjunction. Note that the use of ! makes
it possible to recover classical reasoning, as formulae beginning with ! with ?
in a succedent behaves classically, in that such formulae may used arbitrarily
many times, including 0, rather than exactly once. Hence chips corresponds
to exactly one serving of chips, ! chips corresponds to an arbitrary number
of servings (including 0). In this way we may think of a formula !F in linear
logic as representing an unbounded resource, i.e. one that may be used as many
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times as we like. Thus classical logic may be seen as a particular fragment of
linear logic, in that there is a class of linear formulae which precisely matches
classical formulae.
Linear logic also contains a negation, which behaves in a manner reminis-
cent of classical negation. The negation of a formula F is written as F⊥. As
there are two conjunctions, there are two corresponding disjunctions, as well
as a dual to ! denoted as ?. The following laws, reminiscent of the de Morgan
laws, all hold:
(F1 ⊗ F2)⊥ ≡ (F1)⊥ O (F2)⊥ (F1 O F2)⊥ ≡ (F1)⊥ ⊗ (F2)⊥
(F1 ⊕ F2)⊥ ≡ (F1)⊥ N (F2)⊥ (F1 N F2)⊥ ≡ (F1)⊥ ⊕ (F2)⊥
Each of these four connectives also has a unit, which, for ⊗ and N are
written as 1 and , and which may be thought of as generalisations of the
boolean value true, and for O and ⊕ are written as ⊥ and 0, and which may
be thought of as generalisations of the boolean value false.
There is far more to linear logic than can be discussed in this paper; for a
more complete introduction see the papers [11,10,31,2], among others. A part
of the sequent calculus for linear logic is given in Appendix A.
2.3 Logic Programming in Linear Logic
The execution models on which these languages are based have generally been
based on backward-chaining, i.e. given a number of statements (or formulae)
which make up the program, the user then requests the system to determine
whether or not a given formula (the goal) follows from the information in the
program. The way that this is achieved is generally by working backwards, i.e.
establishing premises which, if true, would establish the truth of the goal. This
process is repeated until either an unconditional statement of truth is found
(an axiom), in which case the original goal succeeds, or no such premises can be
found, in which case the original goal fails. Hence backward-chaining consists
of starting with a given conclusion and working our way back (hopefully) to
the axioms.
Whilst this paradigm appears to be intuitive and natural for various appli-
cations, such as querying a database, or solving a particular set of constraints,
it does not allow programs to react to an environment, as they must wait for
a speciﬁc goal to be given. In applications such as a stock market monitor,
it is generally desirable to have the program “watch” the environment, which
may include large amounts of data, until a given set of circumstances is ob-
served, such as a sharp fall in the price of a blue-chip stock. Then it would
be expected to take the appropriate action, such as buying such stock, and
selling it again once the price has recovered. Thus the key element is for the
program to evaluate the current environment until certain trigger conditions
are met.
94
Harland and Winikoff
Such reactive behaviour is more akin to forward-chaining, which is a method
of reasoning which begins with the axioms, and applies any known rules to
generate new results. In the context of linear logic, which is well-known to
be a useful way to model and reason about state changes, a forward-chaining
approach seems particularly suitable for reactive systems, as this provides a
simple and natural way to express conditions which are dependent on the
dynamics of the environment.
The techniques for backward-chaining (both classically and for linear logic)
are well-known [20,25,27,15]; the integration of forward-chaining techniques
into such a system was investigated in [13]. In particular, this allows a com-
bination of don’t know nondeterminism (common in logic programming) via
backward-chaining with don’t care nondeterminism via forward-chaining.
Such an integrated system is thus able to both follow a planned sequence
of instructions (backward-chaining) and react to the environment and make
appropriate changes (forward-chaining). In particular, this may be thought
of as an increased emphasis on process-oriented computation (such as the safe
running of a power plant or operating system) rather than result-oriented
computation (such as calculating a pay cheque or checking whether a given
credit card number is valid). As argued in [32,3], amongst others, the process
view of computation is one that is becoming increasing important, and in
which safety considerations are vital.
Kowalski and Sadri [21] developed extensions to the traditional logic pro-
gramming paradigm to incorporate agent features. A key diﬀerence in our
approach is the use of linear logic, which provides a better representation of
dynamic information (such as actions and environmental changes) than clas-
sical logic.
The key technical point is to determine the appropriate inference rules
for the forward-chaining part of the system. At ﬁrst, this may seem rather
trivial, in that we simply take the well-known rule of modus ponens, and use
it to determine that B follows from A and A ⊃ B. However, there are some
subtleties to this, particularly for resource-sensitive logics.
In the classical case, the formulae A ∧ A ⊃ B and A ∧ B are equivalent,
which means that a forward-chaining system based on this rule has several
strong properties. One of these is monotonicity, in that the set of conclusions
reached can only increase. This property is exploited not only in the well-
known TP semantics for logic programs [7], but also by deductive database
systems such as Aditi, for which the monotonicity property is the underlying
reason behind the diﬀerential optimisation.
The corresponding analysis in linear logic is not as straightforward, though,
as the above equivalence does not hold. In particular, given p and p q, it
is possible to derive q, but p is “consumed” in this process. Hence the use of
modus ponens in linear logic is more like a committed choice, in that once the
inference rule is applied, p is no longer available, but q is, and so our analysis
needs to proceed in a more subtle way than in the classical case.
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Our general procedure is to integrate elements of forward-chaining into
the standard sequent calculus for linear logic (which is given in an Appendix).
The sequent calculus is well-known as an inference system which permits an
appropriate analysis of backward-chaining, and whilst there are systems simi-
larly suitable for forward-chaining (such as natural deduction and Hilbert-type
systems), it is not clear how backward-chaining can be introduced into such
systems.
It should be noted that backward-chaining techniques are generally applied
to a program and a goal: given a program P and a goal G, we proceed to search
for a proof of the sequent P  G via some appropriate search strategy. Such
proofs are generally cut-free, in that the cut rule is not used in the search, as
it may introduce formulae with no known relationship to the original sequent,
and thus result in a hopelessly infeasible search.
By contrast, forward-chaining techniques are applied to a program, and
produce another program. Hence, the natural approach is to deﬁne a relation
 between programs, so that P  P ′ denotes that P ′ can be derived from P
(via forward-chaining techniques).
We then need to determine not only the rules for , but also how these
inference rules interact with the standard rules of the linear sequent calculus
(and hence with backward-chaining methods). Our approach is to model
the interaction between the two types of inference by a particular type of
occurrence of the cut rule, known as direct or analytic cuts. In particular, given
a forward-chaining inference P  P ′ and a backward-chaining one P ′′  G,
then these two inferences can synchronise when P ′ = P ′′. Thus we have that
from P  P ′ and P ′  G we can deduce P  G, which is just an instance of
the cut rule. The key point to note is that not only are P and G known at
the outset, but also that we expect the inference rules for a conclusion such as
P  P ′ to be such that given P , we can readily derive P ′ from an appropriate
number of applications of the rule.
In this sense the rules for are reminiscent of conditional rewriting rules,
or of Plotkin’s Structured Operational Semantics [26], in that given a unary
rule for 
P  P ′′
P  P ′ R
it will generally be the case that P is known but P ′ is not, and so we will use
the premise (and any appropriate sub-proofs) to evaluate P to P ′′, and then
using the rule R we will then determine that P  P ′.
Hence we proceed by inserting cuts into the inference rules of the linear
sequent calculus, and study the properties of the resulting rules. We have
some preliminary results along these lines, which derive an appropriate set
of inference rules for  and examines their integration into the linear se-
quent calculus. These results were published in [13] and include permutation
properties (which are fundamental to the issue of proof normalizations and
hence proof-search strategies) and cut-elimination results. Some of the rules
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for mixed-mode inference in linear logic can be found in Appendix B. For the
full set of rules (and additional details relating to quantiﬁcation) see [13].
3 Designing Agent Programming Systems
In [14] it was discussed how an agent system requires (at least) the properties
below:
(i) A means of decomposing a given goal G into subgoals
(ii) A means of determining a set of possible plans to achieve the subgoals
(iii) A means of monitoring environmental changes and accordingly evaluating
the most appropriate plan to execute
We have discussed how backward and forward chaining can be integrated
within the one inference system. This section discusses how these two aspects
of the uniﬁed inference system can naturally model agents. In particular
backward chaining is used to model the proactive aspect of the agent (which
involves ﬁnding ways to achieve goals), and forward chaining is used to model
the reactive aspect of the agent (which involves integrating events/percepts).
We also show below how actions can be performed via forward chaining.
An agent can be represented by the sequent
E ,A,B, !P  G
where B is the beliefs of the agent (which are linear since they change), P
is the program clauses (i.e. goal-plan decompositions), and G is the agent’s
goals 4 . We also allow events (E) and actions (A) to appear.
The following proof fragment illustrates the interaction of backwards chain-
ing over goals (proactive) with actions. Events are also handled using forward
chaining (). Adding an action (A) to the context triggers forward chaining
using a directed cut (labelled Cut  below):
....
P , A P ′
....
P ′  G′, . . . , Gn
P , A  G′, . . . , Gn Cut 
P  A G′, . . . , Gn  -R
....
P  G1, . . . , Gn
where P includes both beliefs (linear) and program clauses (non-linear), which
may include action descriptions.
One issue concerns the choice of rules: the inference rules do not constrain
which rule is to be applied at any given point. However, in order for agents to
respond to events in a timely fashion, and in order for actions to be executed
4 Actually since G includes executing plans it is closer to the intention structure
97
Harland and Winikoff
when they are scheduled we would like to constrain the selection of rules. In
particular, whenever there are events or actions in the left side (antecedent)
of the sequent (i.e. ∆, do(A)  Γ or ∆, event(E)  Γ) it seems reasonable
to expect that forward-chaining will be performed in preference to backward-
chaining. Hence as planning is implemented via backward-chaining, actions
and events tend to take precedence over planning computations.
To make things concrete, consider an “embedded” variety of the blocks
world, in which blocks can be moved around or added to the system without
the agent doing so (and hence the environment can alter the position and
number of blocks). There are red and blue blocks, and the agent’s goal is to
ﬁnish with a pile of blocks that has a red block on top and a blue block under
it.
We use the following predicates in the rules below:
blue(X) block X is blue
red(X) block X is red
ontable(X) block X is sitting on the table
on(X,Y) block X is on block Y
clear(X) block X is clear, i.e. no block is on top of it
empty the robot arm is empty
holds(X) block X is in the robot arm
move move a red block onto a blue one
put(X,blue) put block X onto a blue block
This leads to rules such as those below. We assume that red and blue
are classical (i.e. blocks do not change colour). We also assume that ⊗ binds
tighter than , that  binds tighter than ∀, and that ∀ binds tighter than
!. Thus !∀x p⊗ q r ⊗ s is parsed as !(∀x ((p⊗ q) (r ⊗ s))).
! ∀x, y red(x) ⊗ blue(y) ⊗ clear(x) ⊗ on(x,y)  redtop
! ∀x, y move⊥  red(x) ⊗ blue(y) ⊗ clear(x)
! ∀x, y move ⊗ on(x,y) ⊗ red(x) ⊗ red(y) ⊗ clear(x) ⊗ empty
 clear(y) ⊗ hold(x) ⊗ put(x,blue)
! ∀x, y move ⊗ ontable(x) ⊗ red(x) ⊗ clear(x) ⊗ empty
 hold(x) ⊗ put(x,blue)
! ∀x, y put(x,blue) ⊗ hold(x) ⊗ clear(y) ⊗ blue(y)
 on(x,y) ⊗ clear(x) ⊗ empty
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Given these rules (which we denote R) and an initial state of the blocks,
say F , we then wish to determine whether R,F  R,F ′ such that redtop is
true in F ′, so that our goal is redtop ⊗.
Clearly if for some blocks t and v we have
{on(t, v), clear(t), !red(t), !blue(v)} ⊆ F
then no actions are taken. Otherwise, for example if we have the facts
!red(a), !red(b), on(a, b), ontable(b), clear(a), !blue(c), ontable(c), clear(c)
then the ﬁrst two rules can be used in a backward-chaining manner to
reduce the goal to move⊥, which adds the fact move to the program. Forward-
chaining using the last two rules then takes place to get ﬁrstly the replacement
of
move ⊗ on(a,b) ⊗ clear(a) ⊗ empty
by
clear(b) ⊗ hold(a) ⊗ put(a,blue)
and then to replace
hold(a) ⊗put(a,blue) ⊗ clear(c)
with
clear(a) ⊗ on(a,c) ⊗ empty.
As there are no actions here, no further changes take place.
In the event that the blocks arrangement changes during computation,
then the pre-condition of the move action may fail (as a may no longer be on
top of b, or a may no longer be clear) or there may not be a clear blue block to
place the red one on. In such cases backtracking (including backtracking over
the unsuccessful action move) will lead to re-evaluation of the overall goal.
Hence when backtracking in the presence of actions, we may need to re-try
goals which in the standard logic programming paradigm would fail; this is
simply a reﬂection of the persistence of goals in a situated environment [34].
4 Scheduling Issues
It is one thing to derive a set of inference rules; it is another to design a
programming language based on them. In particular, we need to determine
an appropriate computational interpretation of forward-chaining and its in-
tegration with backward-chaining rules (whose operational behaviour is well
understood). In order to do so, we will make two simplifying assumptions, in
order to illustrate the principles involved.
The ﬁrst assumption is based on the observation that the vast majority
of programs written in linear logic programming languages do not use linear
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rules (e.g. [12,15]). In other words, most applications of linear logic in logic
programming use rules which can be used any number of times (including
0) together with a mixture of classical and linear facts (i.e. some of which
can be used an arbitrary number of times, and some of which must be used
exactly once). For example, a set of rules describing actions that may be
taken together with the current state of the world ﬁts this scenario, such as
the blocks world or a bin-packing problem. Hence, as far as the forward-
chaining aspect is concerned, we can consider a program as a set of classical
rules with a mixture of classical and linear facts to be used as input.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Deﬁnite and goal formulæ are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnite formulæ: D ::= A | 1 | D ⊗D | D N D | ∀x.D |!D | G D
Goal formulæ: G ::= A | 1 | G⊗G | G N G | G⊕G | ∀x.G | ∃x.G |!G
A program is a multiset of closed deﬁnite formulae in which every occurrence
of is within the scope of a !.
Thus we can consider a program to consist of two parts: a multiset of
rules R, which must be classical, and a multiset of facts F , which may contain
either linear or classical formulae.
The second assumption is also to do with the pragmatics of execution, and
in particular the extra choices available in the linear case when compared to
the classical one. Consider the program p, !(p q), !(p r). Here, as the fact
p can be applied to either (but only one of) the two rules, there is a choice to
be made as to whether this program should “evolve” to q, !(p q), !(p r)
or to r, !(p q), !(p r).
In the classical case, this choice does not have to be made, as due to the
ability to make arbitrary copies of formulae, we can duplicate p and hence
apply both rules in parallel. In the linear case, though, we cannot duplicate
and hence must make a choice.
In terms of inference rules, it is not diﬃcult to show that we can derive
qN r, !(p q), !(p r) from this program, which essentially delays any choice
between q and r to a later point in the computation. However, this introduces
the possibility of having to keep track of a large number of possible branches,
and so, at least initially, it will be simpler to avoid this behaviour (which may
be thought of as an analogy of breadth-ﬁrst search in the classical case), if
possible. One way to do this is to insist that the rules of the program be
independent (i.e. they operate on diﬀerent parts of the facts). For example,
given the facts {p, q, r} the two rules !p  r and !q  r are independent,
but the two rules ∆ = {!(p ⊗ q)  r, !(p ⊗ r)  s} are not independent. If
rules are not independent, then we need to use N as above. For example, if ∆
denotes the two rules above, then p, q, r,∆ (r ⊗ r) N (q ⊗ s),∆.
This property also makes it possible to think of the rules as independent,
in that two rules R1 and R2 are either not both applicable or they operate
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on separate pieces of the program. Hence a program will consist of a number
of facts (linear or classical) together with a collection of independent rules
R1, R2, . . . Rn and a collection of inter-dependent rules R. The operational
semantics of the program will be determined by the way in which these rules
are applied to the facts. One reasonable heuristic is to apply the independent
rules before the inter-dependent ones, on the grounds that the changes made
by the independent rules may break some of the inter-dependencies. Other-
wise, if all such inter-dependencies remain, then the only possibility seems to
be the use of N as mentioned above.
This is a ﬁner-grained notion than in the classical case. There, as facts
may be arbitrarily copied, all rules are independent, as it is possible to make
as many copies as is needed to satisfy each rule. Moreover, systems such as
Aditi generally compute “to the ﬁxpoint”, i.e. the set of new facts accumulates
until no more can be generated. Hence we can think of this as the rules being
ﬁred in parallel as many times as needed in order to generate the ﬁxpoint.
We now deﬁne rule scheduling expressions that can be used to describe
strategies for applying rules. Given rules R1 and R2 we can apply the rules
sequentially (denoted by R1R2) or in parallel (denoted by R1 ∪ R2). Also,
given a rule R we can apply it until it can no longer be applied or a ﬁxpoint is
reached (denoted R∗). Note that this notation is similar to regular expressions.
Using this notation we can describe the scheduling applied by systems such
as Aditi with the expression (R1 ∪ R2 ∪ . . . ∪ Rn)∗, in that a (ground) fact A
will be generated by this process if there is some sequence of application of
the rules R1, . . . Rn to the facts which results in A.
In the linear case, we do not necessary want to compute ﬁxpoints; in
particular, unlike the classical case, ﬁxpoints do not always exist. For example,
consider the program p, !(p q), !(q p). These rules are independent, but
repeated application of the rules will see the program oscillate between the
above and q, !(p  q), !(q  p). Thus we require that forward-chaining
terminates not at ﬁxpoints, but when a given goal G is satisﬁed.
Now for independent rules R1 and R2, it is clear that (R1 ∪ R2)(F ) =
(R1R2)(F ) = (R2R1)(F ), and hence we can choose to execute such rules either
in parallel (R1 ∪R2) or in a particular sequence. However, we do not know in
advance whether or not an application of R1 or R2 alone will suﬃce to prove
the overall goal. Furthermore, as a given rule, say R1 may be applicable to a
number of facts in the program, we also need to consider whether we should
check for termination after each application of R1, or after all applications of
R1.
Hence we need to make two strategic decisions: whether to pursue the
independent rules parallel or in some sequence; and whether to pursue the ap-
plication of each independent rule in parallel or in sequence on all appropriate
facts.
In the absence of any other information, a reasonable default would be
to do both in sequence, in order to maximise the ability to ﬂexibly react to
101
Harland and Winikoff
environmental changes. Hence if each independent rule Ri can be applied ni
times to the facts, this is just the sequence of rule applications of the form
(R1)
n1(R2)
n2 . . . (Rm)
nm which is essentially a depth-ﬁrst application of the
rule instances.
A sequence of similar granularity is (R1R2 . . . Rn)
k where k is the maximum
of n1, n2, . . .nm, which is a breadth-ﬁrst application of the rule instances.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
This paper has discussed various implementation issues for a framework for
agents based on mixed mode computation in linear logic. In a sense, this is the
ﬁrst tentative step of the ambitious programme outlined in [14]. In particular,
in the integration of the forward- and backward-chaining techniques it seems
reasonable to give preference to forward-chaining (i.e. actions and reactions
to environmental changes) over backward-chaining. However, this will require
some counterintuitive features, such as backtracking over actions and re-trying
goals which have already failed. However, both seem reasonable in the context
of a dynamic environment.
One clear issue that is raised by the independence property of rules is that
the use of aggregate constructs (such as Negation as Failure, or ﬁndall) will
be crucial to the development of applications. A linear rule such as A  B
may be thought of as having an implicit existential quantiﬁer: “if there is a
resource A, then change it to B”. A complementary rule would then be of the
form “if there is no such resource, then ...”. A logical method of specifying
such rules is clearly of fundamental importance.
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A Sequent Calculus for Linear Logic
φ  φ axiom
Γ  φ,∆ Γ′, φ  ∆′
Γ,Γ′  ∆,∆′ cut
Γ, φ, ψ,Γ′  ∆
Γ, ψ, φ,Γ′  ∆ X-L
Γ  ∆, φ, ψ,∆′
Γ  ∆, ψ, φ,∆′ X-R
Γ  ∆
Γ,1  ∆ 1-L  1 1-R
⊥  L
⊥ Γ  ∆
Γ  ⊥,∆ R
⊥
Γ,0  ∆ 0-L Γ  ,∆ -R
Γ  φ,∆
Γ, φ⊥  ∆ ⊥-L
Γ, φ  ∆
Γ  φ⊥,∆ ⊥-R
Γ, φ, ψ  ∆
Γ, φ⊗ ψ  ∆ ⊗-L
Γ  φ,∆ Γ′  ψ,∆′
Γ,Γ′  φ⊗ ψ,∆,∆′ ⊗-R
Γ, φ  ∆
Γ, φ N ψ  ∆
Γ, ψ  ∆
Γ, φ N ψ  ∆ &-L
Γ  φ,∆ Γ  ψ,∆
Γ  φ N ψ,∆ &-R
Γ, φ  ∆ Γ, ψ  ∆
Γ, φ⊕ ψ  ∆ ⊕-L
Γ  φ,∆
Γ  φ⊕ ψ,∆
Γ  ψ,∆
Γ  φ⊕ ψ,∆ ⊕-R
Γ, φ  ∆ Γ′, ψ  ∆′
Γ,Γ′, φ O ψ  ∆,∆′ O -L
Γ  φ, ψ,∆
Γ  φ O ψ,∆ O -R
Γ  φ,∆ Γ′, ψ  ∆′
Γ,Γ′, φ ψ  ∆,∆′ -L
Γ, φ  ψ,∆
Γ  φ ψ,∆ -R
Γ, φ  ∆
Γ, !φ  ∆ !-L
!Γ  φ, ?∆
!Γ !φ, ?∆ !-R
!Γ, φ ?∆
!Γ, ?φ ?∆ ?-L
Γ  φ,∆
Γ ?φ,∆ ?-R
Γ  ∆
Γ, !φ  ∆ W !-L
Γ  ∆
Γ ?φ,∆ W?-R
Γ, !φ, !φ  ∆
Γ, !φ  ∆ C!-L
Γ ?φ, ?φ,∆
Γ ?φ,∆ C?-R
Γ, φ[t/x]  ∆
Γ,∀x . φ  ∆ ∀-L
Γ  φ[y/x],∆
Γ  ∀x . φ,∆ ∀-R
Γ, φ[y/x]  ∆
Γ,∃x . φ  ∆ ∃-L
Γ  φ[t/x],∆
Γ  ∃x . φ,∆ ∃-R
where y is not free in Γ, ∆.
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B Mixed-mode Inference Rules from [13] (excerpt)
We denote the free variables of a formula F as free(F ), and
⋃
F∈P free(F ) as
free(P ).
Deﬁnition B.1 Let P be a multiset of deﬁnite formulae, and let x, y ∈
free(P ). The variables x and y are connected in P if ∃F ∈ P such that
x, y ∈ free(F ), or ∃z, F such that x, z ∈ free(F ) and z and y are connected in
P .
A free variable x in free(P ) is connected to a formula F ∈ P if x is
connected to a free variable in F .
A formula ∀x1 . . . ∀xnF1⊗Fk is tightly quantiﬁed if xi is connected to each
Fj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and each Fj is tightly quantiﬁed.
Deﬁnition B.2 Let {P1, . . . Pn} be a maximal partition of a multiset of def-
inite formulae P such that free(Pi) ∩ free(Pj) = ∅ for i = j.
We deﬁne ♦P as
n⋃
i=1
∀(⊗Pi). We deﬁne ♠P as
n⊗
i=1
∀(⊗Pi).
Deﬁnition B.3
P  P Axiom A  A Axiom 
P  P ′
P , !D  P ′ W 
P , !D, !D  P ′
P , !D  P ′ C 
P  P ′′ P ′′  P ′
P  P ′ Cut
P  P ′ ♦P ′  G
P  G Cut 
P  P ′
P ,P ′′  P ′,P ′′ Weak
P1  P ′ ♦P ′  G
P1,P2, G D  P2, D 
P , Di  P ′
P , D1 N D2  P ′ N 
P , D1, D2  P ′
P , D1 ⊗D2  P ′ ⊗
P , D  P ′
P , !D  P ′ !
P  P ′
P ,1 P ′ 1
P , D[t/x] P ′
P ,∀xD  P ′ ∀
P  P1 . . . P  Pn
P  (♠P1) N . . . N (♠Pn) collect
!P  P ′
!P !♦P ′ !M
 1 1 
P 
P  ⊥ ⊥  P    
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P  G1 P ′  G2
P, P ′  G1 ⊗G2 ⊗ 
P  G1 P  G2
P  G1 N G2 N 
P  Gi
P  G1 ⊕G2 ⊕ 
!P  G
!P !G ! 
P  G[y/x]
P  ∀xG ∀ 
P  G[t/x]
P  ∃xG ∃ 
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